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However, his interpretation has a slightly revised connotation that the consciousness possessing the 
[actually non-existent] object in the past and the future does not possess the [actually existent] object.  
Finally, in confutation against this interpretation, the proponent suggests his opponent the 
relationship between cause and effect concealed in the relationship between the object of consciousness 
and consciousness. Namely, the [actually existent] cause, i.e., the object of consciousness, engenders 
the result, i.e., the consciousness. Therefore, when the result (i.e., consciousness) is existent, the 
[actually existent] cause, (i.e., the object of consciousness) is always existent. In other words, 
consciousness always possesses the [actually existent] object. As a result, the opponent cannot persist in 
his interpretation of the traditional doctrine by slightly revising his claim. 
 
 
About the Definition of ?lambana in ?lambanapar?k?? 
ITO Yasuhiro 
 
As well known, Dign?ga (ca. 480-540) discusses the thesis of the cognized objects (?lambana) in 
?lambanapar?k??. In this work he specifies two conditions which the cognizable objects should fulfill. 
The cognizable objects for certain knowledge must fulfill conditions that they consist of the 
source of the knowledge and have the same images (?k?ra) as the knowledge. 
These conditions are reasonably supported by the theory of s?k?rav?da, which states that 
knowledge is endowed with the image of its object and position. However Dign?ga proves the statement 
scrupulously and thereby develops the argument leading to the conclusion that the theory of 
"cognition-only" (vijñaptim?trav?da) is drawn inevitably.  
This paper aims to interpret the text in detail based on notes, add logical analysis and 
consideration in terms of the above contents and thereby clarify the definition of cognized objects 
(?lambana) bibliographically. 
 
 
Dharmottara’s Understandings of Mental Perception (m?nasa) 
HAYASHI Keijin 
 
Dharmottara, a commentator on Dharmak?rti’s works, is the first scholar that shows a special 
attitude toward mental perception. He says that the existence of mental perception is allowed only from 
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the traditional and dogmatic standpoint. However he comments on DharmakIrti’s its definition because 
he finds no vital reason to deny its existence.  
He analyses its definition in the way no other scholar has ever treated. He says its definition can 
be considered in three ways as follows: 
(1) uniqueness of its cause 
(2) uniqueness of its object 
(3) uniqueness of itself (=mental perception) 
Using this analysis, he judges the cause of mental perception as continuous one 
(saman?ntara-pratyaya) and its object as cooperating factor with sense perception. Taking his own 
standpoint about mental perception, he refutes the interpretation made by an another commentator 
Vin?tadeva. 
 
 
The Two Meanings of the Word pram??a and Their Relationship 
MIYO Mai 
 
The word pram??a, which is widely used as a key term of epistemology in Indian philosophy, 
seems to have two meanings in the Buddhist logico-epistemological school. Namely, it means valid 
cognition (samyagjñ?na) in the context of explaining that pram??a falls into two categories, perception 
(pratyak?a) and inference (anum?na). In the context of explaining what is called the theory of 
non-distinction between pram?na and its result (pram??aphala), pram??a is the fact that cognition has 
the image of the object (meyar?pt?), or the form of the grasper (gr?hak?k?ra), which means that it is 
the direct factor for determining which object cognition perceives. 
In this article, I begin by focusing on how we can understand the two meanings of the word 
pram??a in a consistent manner, and I find that according to Dign?ga it is used metaphorically 
(upac?r?t) in the sense of valid cognition. That is to say, when pram??a as valid cognition, 
corresponding to perception and inference, is analyzed through the opposing concepts of means of 
cognition (pram??a) and result of cognition (pram??aphala), it ought to be equated with the result of 
cognition. In this case, the word pram??a is used in the sense of the result of cognition, that is, the 
result of pram??a. 
Secondly, I attempt to compare this usage of the word pram??a with that in the Ny?ya school. In 
the case of the Ny?ya school, the Ny?yas?tra defined some pram??as as cognition, and at the stage of 
the Ny?yabh??ya and Ny?yav?rttika there coexisted two definitions of pram??a, one as valid cognition 
